Abstract. When arguing, agents may want to discuss about the details after agreeing about the general problems. We propose to model this kind of situation using an extended argumentation framework with potential attacks. Agents negotiate about raising potential attacks or not, in order to maximize the number of their accepted arguments. The result of the negotiation process consists in the formation of coalitions composed by those agents which have found an agreement. The two proposed negotiation protocols have been implemented and an evaluation, addressed by means of experimental results, shows which combination of strategies and negotiation protocol allows the agents to optimize outcomes.
Introduction
Agents communicate with each other by exchanging the arguments on which their beliefs are grounded. The degree of information each argument brings to the agents can be subject of debate. Consider the well known blocks world environment. Communicating robots discuss about their plans and their joint feasibility. For instance, suppose that an agent asserts her will to put down block A while another agent states that she will stack block B on block C. These two arguments address only general issues while the matter is how each party intends to "refine" them. Boella et al. [2] propose to model the refinement process by extending an abstract argumentation framework with potential, or voluntary, attack relations. The aim of this paper is to analyze how these attacks impact on a multiagent system, where agents have to consider the consequences of their actions in the social context.
We address the following research questions: Which negotiation protocols are suitable? Which strategic behaviors can agents adopt? What are coalitions in this context? We briefly resume the concept of extended argumentation framework with voluntary attacks, then we present two negotiation protocols for deciding whether to carry out potential attacks and several strategic behaviors. Finally, we define coalitions as a side-effect of the negotiation process, i.e. as a structure which is created when a solution is achieved during the negotiation. Experiments and conclusions end the paper. 
Agents and arguments
Given a Dung argumentation framework [4] AF = A, R, an extended argumentation framework with potential attacks AF + is a triple A, R, P , with a set of abstract elements called arguments A, and two disjoint binary relations, called attack and potential attack, R, P ⊆ A × A, R ∩ P = ∅. Intuitively, a potential attack indicates the possibility that, in the evolution of an argumentation framework, an attack relation is established among two arguments. A potential attack is translated into a classical attack when it is concretized, or it is removed from the framework when it is chosen not to insert it. We assume to have a distributed and decentralized set of agents AG. Each agent controls a set of arguments of the AF + as expressed by the relation Ctrl arg ⊆ A×AG. Arguments represent the objectives of the agents, the proposals they address to the other agents. We define also the relation Ctrl att ⊆ P ×AG, which associates every potential attack to the agents which can activate or deactivate it. The goal of the multiagent system is to gradually obtain a grounded framework where all potential attacks have been either concretized or removed.
Example 1. Consider the example visualized in Figure 1 .a: two robots, P and Q, operate in the blocks world. P holds block A and Q holds block B, while block C lies on the table. Suppose that P 's goal is to put down block A and Q's is to put block B on block C. P can achieve her goal by putting block A on the table or on block C, and therefore her argument can be refined to put block A on block C or put block A on the table. Now suppose that Q cannot unstack A from C before putting B down on C due to some resource limitation (the set of actions may require too much time or battery power). Therefore one of P argument's refinements attacks Q's argument and P 's argument potentially attacks Q's argument. P controls the (p1, q1) attack. Figure 1 .b is the extended argumentation framework.
Given an AF + , every possible framework achievable from a potential attack activation/deactivation is a scenario. A final scenario is a scenario which does not contain potential attacks. Each agent ag i evaluates the desirability of a scenario taking into account the acceptability of its arguments and the values of parameters α i and β i .
Definition 1 (Agents' parameters).
-Parameter α j i is associated with each argument j of agent ag i and it describes the evaluation of j from ag i .
-Parameters β j,k i+ and β j,k i− are defined if j, k ∈ A and (j, k) ∈ P and Ctrl att ((i, j), ag i ).
-Parameter γ i is the relative sociality of ag i .
Parameter α j i allows the agents to have preferences on the arguments they own. Notice that this preference relation is defined for the couple agent-argument and it does not depend on the AF + , i.e., on the acceptability of the arguments.
Parameters β j,k i+ and β j,k i− model the cost associated to the activation β i+ or deactivation β i− of the potential attack. Parameter γ i indicates the relative sociality of the agent regarding coalitions. An agent with a high γ i will evaluate as fundamental being part of a coalition while an agent with a low γ i will evaluate this situation as uninfluential. We assume each agent has a complete knowledge about the AF + and the refinements of each argument but parameters α, β, γ are internal to the agent and they are not known by the other agents. Parameters α i and β i concur in the evaluation of a scenario by means of the utility functions of Definition 2. Definition 2 (Utility functions: cost-benefit analysis).
-ut composes the results of the two previous utility functions. From now on, we will use the term outcome to indicate the utility associated by an agent to a scenario. Example 2 (Continued). In Figure 1 .c, the numbers associated to the arguments represent the value of the α parameter, the tuples of numbers on the attack relations are the values of the β − , β + parameters. In this example, both agents own a single argument; agent P controls the attack (p1, q1), the activation cost of this attack is 0.5 while the deactivation cost is 0.2: for instance, putting block A on block C may require more battery power because it is a more specific action. Since this framework contains a single potential attack there are only two possible final scenarios: in both cases agent P 's argument will be accepted (same ut arg P ), but the agent will choose not to raise the potential attack because the deactivation cost is lower. Agent P could decide whether to activate her attack because there was no other agent controlling a potential attack. In more complex examples, such as the one depicted in Figure 2 , agents have to take into account other agents' arguments and potential attacks, and they need to communicate and negotiate about which subset of potential attacks shall be activated. The outcomes of the agents in the framework of Figure 2 are represented in Table 1 . 
Definition 3 (Preferences among scenarios)
. ∀AF Note that different agents can have different preferences over the set of possible scenarios, so they need to interact in order to find an agreement upon which attack they shall activate or deactivate; moreover, agents' evaluation of the scenarios is not known by the other agents, so there is no way to locally compute a solution and a negotiation process has to be faced.
Negotiation
We introduce two negotiation protocols defined in the context of argumentation frameworks with potential attacks: GP (global protocol) and SP (server-centered protocol). We assume the agents participate to the negotiation process only if they have the control of, at least, one potential attack. We follow the three features for automated negotiation highlighted by Jennings et al. [7] : negotiation objects, negotiation protocols and decisional model of the agents.
Consider the AF + defined in Figure 2 and the outcomes provided in Table 1 . From the perspective of the agents, the relevant issue is the activation/deactivation of the potential attacks with the aim to maximize their outcome. For instance, from the point of view of agent C the relevant issue is the acceptability of argument c2 which means that she needs the deactivation of the potential attack (e2, c2). The knowledge about which refinement of argument e2 of agent E causes the removal of this potential attack is irrelevant for agent C. Thus, the negotiation objects of the agents are the scenarios. This means that the negotiation proposals correspond with the scenarios. We represent the proposals as a tuple of lists of potential attacks P + , P − , the potential attacks the agent desires to activate or remove, respectively. Considering the framework in Figure 2 , a final scenario corresponds to the deactivation of each potential attack and is described by the negotiation proposal {},
The negotiation objects are defined as follows: Definition 4 (Negotiation objects). Given AF + = A, R, P , a proposal is a scenario AF + 1 ∈ S(AF + ). A proposal corresponding to the scenario AF + 1 = A, R 1 , P 1 is formalized as a tuple P + , P − such that:
A partial proposal corresponds to a not final scenario. We consider the minimum among the possible outcomes, which means that we assign to a partial proposal a utility corresponding to the lower bound of the possible outcomes which can be achieved by accepting this proposal. For instance, if agent D is evaluating the partial proposal (e2, c2), (c1, b) from agent C, she attributes it the utility min(ut The GP (Global Protocol) we propose is inspired by the negotiation protocol with simultaneous answer proposed by Kraus [8] , based on the model of alternate offers of Rubinstein [11] . It has the following features: the agents have no roles inside the negotiation protocol (differently from, for example, the Contract Net protocol [12] ), there are no turns and the negotiation is managed synchronically. Kraus [8] presents a way to synchronize the counter-proposals while we extend this synchronization to each agent involved in the negotiation. GP is characterized by a number of rounds t 1 , t 2 , ... At each round t j each agent ag i puts forward a proposal p j i . If, at round t j , a set of agents AG i ∈ AG arrives to a solution S with the resulting proposal p ris , at round t j+1 each agent ag k ∈ AG i can communicate the speech act OK(p ris ), accepting temporarily the solution S. If every agent ag k does it, S is called temporal solution. If, at round t w (w > j + 1), an agent ag k communicates OK(q ris ), such as she accepts another solution, S is no more a temporal solution. Agent ag k can communicate again OK(p ris ) in a round t z (z > w). A further speech act is introduced: NIL. An agent communicates NIL if she does not have further proposals to put forward. The speech acts are mutuated for Kraus [8] and Endriss [5] , respectively. A negotiation ruled by the GP protocol terminates if either a temporal solution S is reached s.t. dom(S) = of f (S) = AG or a round t j s.t. ∀ag i ∈ AG, p j i = NIL is reached. In the first case, the protocol terminates if all the agents involved in the negotiation find a common solution and accept it. In this case, the framework is modified coherently with the scenario which corresponds to the accepted solution. In the second case, the solutions which modify the framework are the temporal solutions of the negotiation.
The SP (Server Protocol) is defined in order to have a different testbed for our framework. It combines elements from the Contract Net protocol [12] and the protocol proposed by Kraus [8] . The features of this protocol are: an agent is chosen to have the role of the server (this choice can be taken by means of a voting phase or it can be driven by the features of the agents, e.g., the agent who controls more potential attacks), the other agents participate to the negotiation as clients, the server declares the conflict deal, such as the result assigned to the negotiation if it fails which consists, in our framework, in an activation/deactivation of a potential attack from the server. Concerning termination, SP terminates when a solution is reached. Thus the speech act OK is not necessary and do not exist temporal solutions. The speech act NIL is admitted for clients. The server is allowed to use a particular speech act, EN D, which terminates the negotiation. A negotiation ruled by protocol SP terminates if either a solution is reached or the server communicates EN D or a round t j s.t. ∀ag i ∈ AG\{SERV ER}, p j i = NIL is reached. In the first case, the protocol terminates if the server and a set (potentially empty) of agents find a common solution. The framework is modified coherently with the scenario corresponding to the accepted solution. The second and third cases correspond to a termination for conflict deal: in the second case, the failure is forced by the server while in the third case, the failure is caused by a lack of new proposals from the clients. In these cases, the framework is modified coherently with the conflict deal.
In the definition of the two protocols above, we have taken inspiration from different protocols existing in the literature: the notion of monotonic concession from [9] and [6] , the roles of server and clients from [12] , the speech acts from [7] and the notion of conflict deal from [5] . Our aim is to create two models for negotiation on potential attacks with substantial differences among them in order to test the performances of different strategies in different contexts.
We now present a number of reasoning mechanisms used by the agents to create the negotiation proposals and to decide whether to accept, refuse or raise other agents' proposals. Given a set of agents, each agent can implement different strategies. We assume that the agents compute the utilities for every scenario before starting the negotiation process. We define the following strategies:
Designative agent: monotonic concession The agent ignores the proposals of the other agents and, at each turn, she advances the more convenient
proposal not yet advanced [5] . Simple reactive agent: conflict deal -aware The agent bases her proposals on the conflict deal, she compares it with her actual proposal and she evaluates whether to advance new proposals or to communicate NIL. This strategy is based on the Zeuthen strategy. Simple reactive agent: solution -aware The agent considers the other agents' previous negotiation proposals and evaluates whether she can create a negotiation proposal which can be integrated with the others in order to create a solution; she compares that proposal with her actual proposal and she decides which one to advance.
Strategic agent: game theory Since the outcomes of the other agents are not known, the Nash equilibrium cannot be computed with certainty. An agent who uses the notion of Nash equilibrium can represent the relation with another agent as a game in normal form expressing the utilities in function of a set of variables, corresponding to the other agent's parameters and then she can evaluate the existence of an equilibrium point for any or, at least, for one value assigned to the variables. Strategic agent: do-ut-des An agent adopting a do-ut-des strategy creates the proposals when she knows she can offer a precise exchange with another agent. If there exist different proposals with these requirements she advances the one with maximal utility.
Coalitions
Coalitions are modeled as a side-effect of the negotiation process and thus as a structure which is created in correspondence of the achievement of a solution during the negotiation. We introduce the notion of multiagent argumentation system M AAS and we define the notion of power.
Definition 6 (Multiagent argumentation system).
A multiagent argumentation system MAAS is a tuple AG, SC, AF + such that: AG is a set of agents ag i with associated parameters α, β, γ and with their own negotiation strategies, SC is a coalition structure associated to AG, AF + = A, R, P is an extended argumentation framework linked to AG by relation R app .
Definition 7 (Agents and coalitions power). Let M AAS = AG, SC, AF
+ :
The value of an agent is a natural number which indicates the number of accepted arguments the agent owns and the value of a coalition is the sum of the values of the single agents composing it. The value of a coalition structure is the sum of the values of the single coalitions composing it. The power of an agent is the tradeoff between her value and the value of her coalition. The power of a coalition is the tradeoff between its value and the value of the coalition structure it belongs to. These values are assigned in order to manage the equilibria of the agents inside the coalitions: we attribute more influence in making decisions to the more powerful agents.
At the beginning of the negotiation process each agent belongs to a singleton coalition. Afterwards, a coalition is created in correspondence with the resolution of a negotiation phase. The new coalition involves those coalitions among which the solution of the negotiation has been found. If the negotiation terminates in conflict deal, given that the agents do not have reached an agreement, no Algorithm 1 Intra-coalition negotiation 1: Each agent agi ∈ cj proposes pi following her private stategies; 2: if one of the proposals is END then 3:
Categorical voting on term;
4:
Eventual split of the coalition in c Y ES and c NO ;
5:
c Y ES communicates END, c NO communicates NIL; 6: end if 7: if If one of the proposals is OK(p) then 8:
Preferential voting among term and p;
9:
if the result is p then
10:
The coalition communicates OK(p);
11:
end if
12:
if the result is term then
13:
Instances of OK(p) are removed from the set of proposals of the agents and go back to (7) Verify the compatibility of the set of proposed scenarios
18:
if compatibility holds then
19:
Compute the natural mediation among the proposed scenarios;
20:
else
21:
Compute deconflictualized mediation;
22:
23:
Categorical voting on the mediation;
24:
25:
c Y ES e c NO restarts independently from (16);
26: end if
coalition is formed. This choice derives from the decision to model the creation of a coalition structure as a parallel process to negotiation and derived from it. Coalition formation is equivalent to the definition of agreement in negotiation. Similar motivations guide the proposal of Cohen and Levesque concerning the notion of shared intention [3] : two agents have the shared intention to perform a collective action if each agent intends to do part of the work in order to achieve the action. On the contrary, a coalition is split if the members composing it do not find an agreement on the negotiation proposal of the other coalitions.
Different intra-coalition mechanisms can be defined and based on the concepts of power and relative sociality. Due to lack of space we omit formal definition and formulae for the next concepts:
-A natural mediation is the resulting proposal from a consistent set of negotiation proposals. -A deconflictualized mediation is the resulting proposal from an inconsistent set of negotiation proposals.
-A preferential voting asks each agent to express preference over a certain negotiation proposal.
-A categorical voting asks each agent to accept or refuse a specific negotiation proposal.
These elements are used in the intra-coalition negotiation Algorithm 1.
Experiments
The protocols and strategies introduced in the previous sections have been implemented in Java in order to compare the negotiation results in different test environments. We focus on two groups of tests: those based on homogeneous multiagent systems (a set of agents implementing the same strategy) and those involving heterogeneous systems for comparing strategies. In the first class of tests, for each combination of MAAS, strategy and negotiation protocol a test has been run. Table 2 .a reports highly aggregated data for this class of tests: the number of rounds needed by the agents to reach a solution, the percentage of accepted arguments in the final scenario, the percentage of activated potential attacks and, when dealing with coalitions, a numerical value describing the coalition structure: it is a value spanning from 0 to 1, where 0 means collection of singleton coalitions and 1 grand coalition.
The second tests' group aims at comparing different strategies. Our inspiration was Axelrod's Iterated Prisoner Dilemma's Tournament . For each protocol/MAAS/pair of strategies, we split the agent set in half and we assign to each half a different strategy. Then we run a dual test after switching the same two strategies assigned to the same two agents' subsets. Our goal is to check if a strategy could grant better results independently of which subset of agents is implementing it. We base our evaluation over the number of accepted arguments owned by each subset of agents at the end of the negotiation phase: the possess of a higher number of accepted arguments reflects how well a strategy works in a certain protocol and MAAS. A single example of comparison among strategies is depicted in Table 2 .b.
Results show that the maximality component in the solution concepts' definition causes agreement among broad sets of agents and short negotiations: the average number of rounds is below 3 and almost always a single, big coalition emerges from the negotiation process, leaving a small collection of single coalitions out. Due to the low number of rounds, the choice of the negotiation protocol does not impact much. The enumerative strategies are the best performing, although they obviously require more computational time, since they generate and examine an exponential number of scenarios. The do-ut-des and game-theoretical strategies cause less-competitive results, due to the clash between their local approach and the global one of argumentation semantics.
Conclusion
We start from the the work proposed by Boella et al. [2] , where an integration between the extended argumentation framework and a multiagent system, based on partitioning of arguments over agents and introducing opaque utility functions is presented. We enrich it by introducing two negotiation protocols based on a set of negotiation strategies and by testing the properties and interactions of these components. Although negotiation and argumentation are widely discussed in the literature (e.g. [1] ), we claim the originality of our approach, where argumentation is not used as a negotiation technique but as a modeling tool which becomes the object of the negotiation process. Simari et al. [10] propose a dynamic argumentation framework, i.e. an extended argumentation framework from which different Dung-style frameworks can be extracted. The two approaches differ, because we use abstract argumentation while Simari does not, and in our case, each agent owns all the information about her arguments, and she has to decide whether to communicate it or not, while in [10] the resulting framework derives from a process of evidence checking rather than deliberation, social choices and strategic issues. Future work addresses the introduction of new non-enumerative (polynomial) strategies as well as coalition -aware ones and the study of their impact.
